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Introduction
It is widely accepted in the scientific and 
medical community that conflicts of inter-
est pose a major problem for scientific and 
clinical integrity, and have the potential to 
erode public trust in academic research.1-4 
Conflicts of interest are defined as situa-
tions or circumstances in which second-
ary financial or other interests may either 
influence or appear to influence profes-
sional actions or judgments.5 A secondary 
interest may not be improper in and of 
itself, but it can conflict with a primary 
interest.6 An academic scientist or clini-
cian may enter into a conflict of interest 
when the economic motives of a private 
funding source or another secondary 
interest unduly influence his or her pri-
mary academic responsibilities.7,8 While 
non-financial pressures such as promo-
tion or recognition may create a conflict 
of interest as indicated, for example, by 
a biased reporting of results, the scien-
tific process and institutional policies 
tend to manage these types of conflicts 
of interest.9 This study considers the non- 
financial pressures, but primarily focuses 
Evaluation of academic scientists’ responses  
to situations that pose a conflict of interest
Joanna K. Sax1,* and Neal Doran2
1California Western School of Law; 2University of California; San Diego, CA USA
Key words: conflicts of interest, scientists, integrity, industry, policy
*Correspondence to: Joanna K. Sax; Email: jsax@cwsl.edu
Submitted: 01/07/11; Revised: 03/21/11; Accepted: 04/02/11
DOI: 10.4161/cbt.12.1.15718
on financial conflicts of interest, which 
are, at present, not adequately governed by 
institutional policies.
Conflicts of interest exist in academic 
science, with reports that funding by pri-
vate industry may include strings such as 
control of the study design or statistical 
analysis.10 Academic scientists face stress-
ful pressures, including but not limited 
to promotion, recognition by peers, pres-
sure to publish, obtain funding and con-
tribute to the public good by addressing 
pain and suffering.9,11 These strong forces 
can create conflicts, but they also serve 
to incentivize biomedical discovery and 
new treatments. These same pressures can 
make academic scientists vulnerable to 
financial conflicts of interest. Put differ-
ently, the need to fund studies to accom-
plish academic goals may create conflicts 
when the for-profit motivations of private 
funding sources place restrictions or pres-
sures on academic scientists to behave in 
certain ways in return for the funding. For 
example, a pharmaceutical company may 
offer to provide funding to an academic 
scientist on the condition that the com-
pany must approve any manuscript prior 
to submission. This creates a conflict of 
interest for the academic scientist because 
the pharmaceutical company’s economic 
motives to control what is published in the 
literature impact the scientist’s primary 
motive to obtain funding for biomedi-
cal inquiry and discovery. Ultimately, 
the strings attached to private funding 
may hurt the public because experimen-
tal results may never be disseminated, 
the results may be presented in a skewed 
manner or doubt may be cast upon the 
results of such studies.12 In addition, these 
situations can impact scientific integrity.13 
However, at the time of entering into the 
agreement with the pharmaceutical com-
pany, the scientist may be primarily con-
cerned with funding research and research 
staff, and may not fully consider the 
potential impact of allowing the for-profit 
motives of the pharmaceutical company to 
control the design of the study or dissemi-
nation of the results.
Another example of a financial con-
flict of interest in academic science con-
cerns the tension between the academic 
goal of publishing results as quickly as 
possible and the private sector’s interest 
The industry-academy relationship has many benefits, but it also has potential drawbacks, including potential conflicts of 
interest (e.g., when the profit motives of a private company unduly influence academic responsibilities). To date, policies 
intended to regulate or manage financial conflicts of interest appear to be unsatisfying and inadequate. The present 
study examined predictors of the responses of academic scientists and clinicians to hypothetical situations in which 
financial and other conflicts of interest may arise. Academic scientists and clinicians at five medical schools completed 
an anonymous survey that included vignettes that posed a potential conflict of interest. Participants indicated the 
likelihood that they would engage in specific actions to avoid conflicts of interest. Findings indicated that junior faculty 
and those whose departments received more federal grant money were more likely to respond in ways that could create 
conflicts of interest (p < 0.05). These results suggest that various sub-groups of faculty may require different approaches 
to appropriately avoid or manage financial conflicts of interest. These findings may contribute to the development of 
new policies that deal more effectively with conflicts of interest.
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interest because junior faculty may be less 
experienced and may be more susceptible 
to the increased pressure to be productive; 
(2) whether faculty with primary research 
responsibilities may respond differently 
than faculty with primary clinical duties; 
and (3) whether responses were related to 
federal grant money per faculty in respon-
dents home departments. The present 
study is complementary to other studies 
that analyze the extent of different types 
of relationships between academia and 
industry.6,25,26 An improved understand-
ing of how academic scientists respond 
to situations in which a conflict of inter-
est may arise may identify areas in which 
appropriate policy incentives can be used 
to minimize conflicts of interest.
Results
Invitations to complete a conflict-of- 
interest survey consisting of seven 
vignettes were sent to 6,357 candidates 
via e-mail. The invitation included a 
brief description of the survey and a link 
to the survey itself (survey available from 
the first author). Of the 6,357 invitations 
sent, 464 (7.3%) were either returned as 
undeliverable or received an “out of office” 
response, leaving a total of 5,893 potential 
participants. A total of 603 (10.2%) fac-
ulty members responded to the survey. In 
terms of academic rank, 138 (22.9%) were 
assistant, 149 (24.7%) associate and 306 
(50.7%) full professors. In terms of spe-
cialty, 262 (43.4%) reported their home 
department as medicine, family medicine, 
pediatrics or emergency; 196 (32.5%) 
as a medical specialty department (e.g., 
dermatology, neurology); 62 (10.3%) as 
psychiatry or psychology; 49 (8.1%) as a 
physical science department (e.g., biology, 
biochemistry); 21 (3.5%) as a social sci-
ence department (e.g., epidemiology); and 
13 (2.2%) as pharmacy. In terms of 2009 
federal grant money received per depart-
ment faculty member, the mean was $0.11 
million (SD = 0.15, range 0–0.93).
Tobit analyses. Vignettes were sorted 
into four categories (pharmaceutical, data, 
profit and promotion) and responses were 
recoded so that zero was the response that 
would be least likely to lead to a conflict of 
interest. We used tobit regression models 
to separately test whether mean responses 
supported by federal funding, giving the 
institution the ability to license technol-
ogy to the private sector.20 This change 
in intellectual property rights spurred the 
creation of Technology-Transfer offices at 
universities.20 Universities created their 
own policies regarding financial conflicts 
of interest; however, the guidelines have 
variability across institutions.1,21
The National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) has policies addressing conflicts 
of interest. Specifically, the NIH requires 
that grant applicants disclose potential 
conflicts of interest. Over the past 15 
years, the NIH lowered the threshold 
amount that must be disclosed.22,23
Reports in the scientific and medical 
literature appear to agree that the myriad 
policies currently in place at universi-
ties and in government are not adequate 
to address the serious issue of conflicts 
of interest.5 Due to the complexity of the 
problem, universities and the government 
struggle to properly regulate this area.5
One approach to moving toward an 
effective policy is to study how academic 
scientists might behave as they enter into 
arrangements that may create conflicts of 
interest. In this way, policymakers can 
attempt to create policies that incentivize 
certain behaviors deemed positive and dis-
incentivize behaviors that are deemed neg-
ative.24 An understanding of how scientists 
respond to situations in which a conflict 
of interest might arise could be important 
to develop policies that effectively address 
conflicts of interest. To this end, the pres-
ent study surveyed academic scientists 
and assessed their responses to hypotheti-
cal situations posing a potential conflict 
of interest. The following questions were 
addressed: (1) whether junior faculty may 
respond differently than senior faculty to 
questions raising a potential conflict of 
in protecting results from disclosure for 
intellectual property protection. For 
example, a pharmaceutical company may 
offer to fund research on drug discovery, 
but require that the academic scientist not 
publish any results until the company can 
obtain intellectual property protection.14 
This may mean that the publication of 
results will be delayed for many years as 
the private company works through a reg-
ulatory approval process. Concerns about 
funding or promotion may, however, place 
the scientist in a position to accept the pri-
vate funding and its attendant strings.
Conflicts of interest exist at the clinical 
level as well. It has been recognized that 
even small gifts from pharmaceutical com-
panies can unduly influence decisions by 
medical students and physicians.15 Studies 
have shown that payments per recruit-
ment of each subject in a clinical trial may 
create conflicts of interest.16 In addition, 
financial conflicts of interest may arise if 
an academic scientist in a clinical trial also 
stands to gain financially from the out-
come of the trial.9,17
Some argue that academic research-
ers are trained to be objective and there-
fore should not be influenced by money.18 
While scientists are trained to be objective, 
and there is the threat of reputational scars 
for failures of objectivity, it would be naïve 
to assume that universities do not require 
appropriate financial conflict of interest 
policies to address the recent increase of 
problems associated with receiving fund-
ing from private sources or holding equity 
in companies.
The rise of financial conflicts of inter-
est appears to coincide with the passage 
of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.19 One 
outcome of the Bayh-Dole Act is that 
academic institutions are allowed to pat-
ent discoveries developed from research 








Pharmaceutical 0.9 (1.3)a 0.8 (1.1)a 0.6 (1.2)b
Profit 2.4 (1.6)c 2.5 (1.6)f 2.1 (1.7)i
Data reporting 1.3 (1.1)d 1.2 (1.2)g 0.9 (1.0)j
Promotion 3.3 (2.0)e 3.0 (1.9)h 2.1 (1.9)i
Note: For all vignette types, scores ranged from 0–9. Across rows (i.e., by academic rank) and 
down columns (i.e., by vignette type within each rank), cells that share the same superscript were 
not significantly different, p > 0.05.
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respond in a way that would minimize 
the possibility of a conflict of interest. In 
addition, with the exception of promotion 
-related vignettes, we found that respon-
dents whose home departments received 
more federal grant money per faculty were 
more likely to respond in ways that would 
increase the probability of a conflict of 
interest.
Interestingly, participants’ mean 
responses varied depending on the type of 
vignette. For example, the mean response 
to vignettes concerning promotion was 
higher (i.e., less appropriate) than to the 
vignettes concerning pharmaceuticals 
(Table 1). The vignettes used to analyze 
these two categories were not overlapping. 
This opens the possibilities to a number 
of explanations: (1) conflicts concerning 
pharmaceuticals are more obvious to fac-
ulty; (2) institutional policies address non-
financial conflicts of interest better than 
financial conflicts of interest or (3) the 
vignette itself did not present as obvious a 
conclusion. In any event, the difference in 
the mean response may be useful in craft-
ing an effective pre-intervention policy 
that governs conflicts of interest.
The difference in responses may provide 
important insight into the need for consis-
tent and effective conflict of interest poli-
cies. That is, the differences in responses 
suggest that new or revised policies may 
be needed. Current approaches to address-
ing conflicts of interest may not account 
for differences in faculty rank, position 
or responsibilities.28 Further, many finan-
cial conflict of interest policies focus on 
profit vignettes. That is, respondents 
whose departments received more federal 
grant money in 2009 tended to give sig-
nificantly higher (i.e., less appropriate) 
responses to these hypothetical situations. 
A one-unit increase in departmental grant 
money (i.e., an additional $1 million per 
faculty) was associated with a 0.5 point 
increase in scores on the pharmaceuti-
cal and data vignettes, and a 0.8 point 
increase on the profit vignettes. The same 
one-unit increase in departmental grant 
money was associated with a 26% increase 
in the probability of non-zero responses 
for the pharmaceutical vignettes, 24% for 
the data vignettes and 12% for the profit 
vignettes. Departmental grant money was 
not significantly associated with responses 
to the promotion vignettes.
Academic sector did not predict 
responses to the pharmaceutical, data or 
promotion vignettes. There was a signifi-
cant effect on the profit vignettes, such 
that non-zero responses from clinicians 
were about 0.3 points lower than non-zero 
responses from researchers. Additionally, 
clinicians were about 4% less likely to 
give non-zero responses compared to 
researchers.
Discussion
This study investigated the responses of 
medical school faculty to vignettes where 
conflicts of interest may arise. For all 
four vignette types, we found that full 
professors were significantly more likely 
than assistant and associate professors to 
to each vignette category differed by aca-
demic rank, academic sector (clinical vs. 
research) and home department federal 
grant money per faculty. Mean ratings 
by rank and vignette type are shown in 
Table 1. The pattern of means suggested 
that full professors differed from other 
faculty; consequently, we dichotomized 
rank into full vs. less than full. Results of 
the four tobit models are shown in Table 
2. We then used the procedure described 
by Roncek to derive from each coefficient 
a value reflecting the change in outcomes 
with a change in the predictor variable 
for those with responses greater than 
zero, and a value reflecting the effect of 
the predictor on the probability of a zero 
response.27
The tobit coefficients for academic 
rank were negative and significant in each 
model, meaning that full professors gave 
significantly lower (i.e., more appropri-
ate) responses to each vignette type. Full 
professors were approximately 11% more 
likely to give a zero response than their 
more junior colleagues on the pharma-
ceutical and data vignettes, and 3 and 5% 
more likely on the profit and promotion 
vignettes. Of those who gave non-zero 
responses, full professors gave responses 
that were 0.20 points lower than other 
faculty on the pharmaceutical vignettes, 
0.22 points lower on the data and profit 
vignettes and 0.31 points lower on the 
promotion vignettes.
The effect of departmental grant 
money per faculty was significant and 
positive for the pharmaceutical, data and 
Table 2. Tobit regression models of vignette responses
Vignette type Predictor Coefficient Std. Err. t-test
Pharmaceutical Rank -0.55 0.08 -7.14**
Department grants 1.37 0.45 3.05**
Sector -0.26 0.21 -1.24
Data Rank -0.42 0.7 5.60**
Department grants 0.97 0.42 2.31*
Sector -0.20 0.12 -1.71
Profit Rank -0.32 0.12 2.51*
Department grants 1.13 0.43 2.64**
Sector -0.39 0.16 -2.39*
Promotion Rank -0.49 0.12 3.97**
Department grants -0.07 0.65 -0.11
Sector -0.24 0.20 -1.17
*p < 0.05; **p<0.01
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may assist in the creation of new and effec-
tive policies to address conflicts of interest. 
The law—which effectively shapes human 
behavior—can be utilized to create incen-
tives for positive behavior and create dis-
incentives for negative behavior in order 
to craft an effective policy that addresses 
faculty behavior before a conflict of inter-
est arises.24
Materials and Methods
Study design and sample. Participants 
were recruited in August and September 
2010 from five medical schools at state 
universities in the southwestern United 
States. All five are members of the same 
state university system. Potential partici-
pants were identified from medical school 
faculty listings on publicly available uni-
versity websites. Due to participants’ ano-
nymity, this study was certified as exempt 
from IRB review by IRBs at participants’ 
institutions.
Survey instrument. After reporting 
their institution, home department, rank 
and academic track and primary sector 
(research or clinical), participants read 
seven vignettes describing situations in 
which a conflict of interest could arise in 
academic research. The vignettes reflected 
potential conflicts with pharmaceutical 
study sponsors, private investors and uni-
versity administration. Participants rated 
their most likely response to each situation 
on a scale from 0–9.
Data analysis. We hypothesized that 
mean vignette responses would differ 
by academic rank and academic sector. 
We also expected response differences 
based on 2009 federal grant money per 
faculty member of respondents’ home 
departments (retrieved from www.
report.nih.gov/funded_organizations/
index.aspx). We sorted the vignettes 
into four non-mutually-exclusive cat-
egories: conflicts with pharmaceutical 
companies (vignettes 1 and 4), reporting 
of data (vignettes 1, 3, 4 and 5), scien-
tific vs. profit motive (vignettes 2, 5 and 
6) and promotion (vignettes 3 and 7). 
Vignettes falling into each category were 
averaged to create category scores that 
were used as outcome variables, and the 
effects of rank, sector and departmental 
grant money were tested separately for 
interest. That is, faculty who are heavily 
dependent on grant money may have dif-
ferent pressures on them than faculty that 
are not as dependent on large amounts of 
grant money.
Third, although the study was not 
explicitly designed to address differences 
between researchers and clinicians, the 
data indicated that these groups may dif-
fer, and may therefore require different 
policies to address the conflicts they may 
face. A previous study by Campbell and 
colleagues found that clinical departments 
have more relationships with industry 
compared to nonclinical departments.25 
This suggests that both the amount and 
type of private funding may be important 
factors for consideration when crafting 
conflict of interest policies. Overall, this 
study exemplifies that work must be done 
in the area of conflicts of interest because 
not all faculty respond the same way when 
faced with a situation in which a conflict 
may arise.
Our study is not without limitations. 
First, we used a small number of vignettes 
in an attempt to understand a much larger 
topic that has many facets. The rationale 
for using seven vignettes was to create a 
less burdensome survey in an effort to 
obtain a larger number of responses. An 
onerous survey that is more time consum-
ing may provide comprehensive results, 
but it also comes with its own limita-
tions (e.g., fewer respondents). Second, 
it is possible that some respondents did 
not answer honestly, potentially bias-
ing the findings. However, the relatively 
large sample and anonymous nature of 
the survey likely minimized this possibil-
ity. Third, the brief survey did not assess 
a number of other factors that are likely to 
influence responses, including the extent 
to which participants have received public 
and private funding, clinical vs. research 
duties and experience with conflicts of 
interest. Finally, although respondents 
were from five different medical schools, 
all five are part of the same state univer-
sity system and may have similar policies 
and training requirements, potentially 
reducing generalizability outside of this 
system.
Importantly, an understanding of how 
academic scientists respond to situations 
in which a conflict of interest might arise 
disclosure after a conflict comes into exis-
tence (e.g., that a gene therapy has been 
patented by a private company with which 
the academic scientist is involved).13,21 
The purpose for the disclosure require-
ment appears to be that an independent 
body may then be appointed or consulted 
to determine whether steps can be taken 
to manage the academic scientist’s conflict 
of interest.1,29 The disclosure approach 
may be inadequate because of the dif-
ficulties associated with evaluating each 
scenario from an ex ante perspective to 
determine if a financial conflict of inter-
est should be addressed such that no harm 
could ever occur. Given that issues with 
conflicts of interest continue to arise in 
academic medicine and lead to reported 
harms, the current policies appear ineffec-
tive or inadequate.
This study may prove helpful in draft-
ing new conflict of interest policies. 
Policy shapes human behavior and can be 
directed towards incentivizing academic 
scientists to respond in a particular way 
when faced with a potential conflict of 
interest. The present study may be helpful 
in the following ways. First, it is of great 
interest that junior faculty (i.e., associate 
or assistant professors) responded differ-
ently to situations concerning a conflict of 
interest hypothetical than senior faculty 
(i.e., full professors). While both junior 
and senior faculty should be governed 
by the same high level conflict of interest 
policies; junior faculty, who are less expe-
rienced and may face different pressures, 
may need targeted education programs or 
other types of oversight in order to assist 
them in recognizing when a conflict of 
interest may be present and in dealing 
effectively with potential conflicts. The 
design of an education or training pro-
gram could be based on other studies 
that analyze ethics training and decision- 
making, and follow-up studies that ana-
lyze the effectiveness of training programs 
should be performed.30
Second, our survey results suggest 
that faculty in departments with larger 
amounts of grant money may respond 
differently than faculty with smaller 
amounts of department grant money, sug-
gesting that the amount of grant money 
in a department may contribute to a 
culture of attitudes towards conflicts of 
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